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Emerging applications require secure group communications around hierarchical architecture protocols, like military
or public emergency applications. However, conceiving such secure hierarchical protocols is not straightforward. Thus,
their verification become a primordial issue in order to avoid the possible security attacks and vulnerabilities. Several
attempts have been done to deal with formal verification of group protocols, but, in our knowledge, none of them has
handled hierarchical ones.
This paper investigates both specific challenges and security issues of hierarchical security group communications, and
an overview of works done for their verification. We have chosen the Back-end Cl-AtSe of AVISPA tool, to verify an
example of such protocols, as it enables to deal with the exponentiation of Diffie-Hellman often used in group key
management.
Mots-cle´s: Hierarchical Group Protocols, Security, Automatic Verification, AVISPA Tool
1 Introduction
The last decade saw an emerging increasing of the need of applications requiring an unbounded number
of participants. Varying from military applications to public emergency ones, conceiving secure group pro-
tocols [MS98, WGL98] has gained increasing importance. In order to be close to the new requirements, a
large number of security group protocols has been oriented to hierarchical architectures [TRP05, BCF05,
HBBC05]. Conceiving such complex protocols is not straightforward. In fact, such protocols highlight new
requirements and consider some complicated intended security properties. Thus, the need to secure them
become increasingly of primordial importance. As such, the architecture security established within a group
application, should be formally verified in order to detect possible vulnerabilities and consequently to cor-
rect them.
Problems for analysing group protocols automatically arise from the fact that most of the verification ap-
proaches can only tackle specific models of protocols, and most of the time require the size of the group to be
set in advance. The main consequence is the restriction of the chances to discover attacks. Moreover, group
membership is very dynamic; participants can join or leave the group at any time. Security requirements are
then more complicated. Some works [STW98, Mea00, TJ03, SBM04] has been done to tackle the problem
of verification of such protocols. However, dealing with hierarchical group protocols arise other problems.
For instance, the definition of security properties become related to the notion of level or class: a piece
of information should be known only by a sub-group and thus must be secret for all the rest of the group.
In our knowledge, no works of specification and verification of this kind of group protocols was undertaken.
In this paper, we focus on this problematic, in the aim to peel the security issues of the hierarchical group
protocols. we present a study carried out arround an example of hierarchical group protocol, in order to
formally verify its key management architecture, and detect the possible security attacks on it. We have
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chosen to use the Back-end Cl-AtSe of AVISPA tool, which provides the possibility of dealing with some
requirements, usually used in group protocols such as algebraic operators like XOR or the exponentiation
of Diffie-Hellman.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present the security issues in the hierarchical group
protocols. An overview of some works done for group protocols verification is provided in section 3. We
also introduce the example of hierarchical group protocol that we have chosen to specify and verify in
section 4. The steps for its verification and the limits of this verification are given in section 5. Finally, we
summarise our study and give some future works.
2 Security Issues in Hierarchical Group Protocols
A group security protocol implies the communication between a set of entities, which can be randomly
large. Group members have to share a secret key to secure communications between them. This key is called
Traffic Encryption Key (TEK). Thus, the management of this group key respresents a crucial functionality
of such type of protocols.
The TEK is used to ensure confidentiality of data , encrypted by the source and decrypted by the receivers.
Moreover, the access control to the group communications is ensured, due to the fact that only members
authorized to join the groupe are able to hold the traffic encryption key, and consequently to reach group
communications. The group key management protocol provides also others security services within the
group, such as data integrity, authentication of the source of the flow, ...
A key management protocol should be adapted to the architecture of the secured group, in order to
provide the required security services for a defined type of communications between the participants of the
group. We distinguich two group architecures:
2.1 Flat Architecture Groups
This kind of groups often requires a centralized or a distributed group key management protocol. For a
centralized protocol such as OFT [MS98] or LKH [WGL98], only one entity called global controller, is
responsible for the generation and the distribution of the group key to its members. Within a distributed
group key management protocol, the control of the group is the responsibility of all the group members,
which cooperate and collaborate to ensure secure communications between them.
2.2 Hierarchical Architecture Groups
They generally require a decentralized group key management protocol, taking into account the hierar-
chisation of the group members and their respective roles within the group. A hierarchical architecture can
be obtained thanks to a clustering mechanism sub-dividing the group into identical clusters with the same
level, or classes with different levels.
2.2.1 Group clustering into clusters
Each created cluster is managed by a local controller sharing with its local members a local secret key.
The local controllers are managed by the global controller of the group, which is responsible for their elec-
tion and the delegation of the management of their respective clusters to them. The clustering mechanism
ensures that the dynamicity of a cluster don’t influence the others group clusters. Thus, a renewal of a local
key within a cluster affects only members of this cluster, and not all the group members. Moreover, the
global controller can delegate the access control to the local controllers, which will be able to authorize or
not members to join the group.
The diffusion of the secured data within a clusterized group is carried out with different manners, accor-
ding to the security policies established within th group. Each cluster could hold its local traffic encryption
key, requiring two operations of data decryption and re-encryption while passing from a cluster to another.
TSUDIK AND AL. [TRP05] propose a group key management protocol, within UAV-MBN networks. In
these networks, there are three levels of nodes. The ground nodes include both regular ground nodes and
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MBN nodes. Regular ground nodes are typically soldiers or agents equipped with computation and commu-
nication limited devices. They communicate through bandwidth-constraint short-range broadcast wireless
channels.
MBN nodes (Mobile Backbone Network) have more capacities than ground nodes. They form with the
regular ground nodes, a hierarchical clusterized ad hoc network, the clusterheads being the MBN nodes.
The UAV Nodes (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) lead the area thaters containing the ground nodes, while en-
suring the connectivity between the different MBNs. The group key management protocol architecture in
[TRP05] is therefore composed of two levels, the first one is the group cells containing the ground nodes,
the second one is the control group represented by the MBN nodes. Each MBN node estbalishes a centra-
lized group key management protocol within its cluster (OFT [MS98]) ; while a distributed and cooperatif
group key management protocol is carried out between the MBN nodes (TGDH [KPT00]).
Others protocols such as [BCF05, DMS99] adopt only one traffic encryption key for all the group members.
The local clusters keys ensure the role of key encryption keys, and consequently the secure distribution of
the TEK to the group members.
The group key management protocol BALADE[BCF05, BLCF04] belong to this approach. BALADE
is dedicated to operate in ad hoc networks. The multicast flow is encrypted by the source using the traffic
encryption key TEK, and forwarded to the group members through the established multicast tree. The basic
idea of BALADE is to clusterize the multicast group, dynamically, into sub-groups. Each one is mana-
ged and controlled by a local controller which shares with its local members a local cluster key. The local
controllers form a multicast group, and share a key encryption key, in order to ensure a secure distribution
of the group TEK.
The hierarchical architecture of BALADE is composed of three levels: the global controller which is repre-
sented by the source responsible for the generation and the distribution of the TEK, the local controllers
group responsible for the secure TEK forwarding, and the group members.
2.2.2 Group clustering into different levels classes
This clustering consists on assembling group members into classes, with different levels. A class level
represents the function or the degree of its members. The classification is thus closely related to the type of
the application to be secured. A military group is composed, for example, of the classes : captains, lieute-
nants, sergeants... Within a class, is elected a controller responsible for the management and the control of
its class members. Each class c holds a traffic encryption key T EKc, generated by the class controller or by
the global controller of the group (which is the controller of the first group class).
According to the security policies of the group, members of class i should be able to reach only communi-
cations of their class, or of the lower classes. The key management within the group must take into account
this assumption, to provide an efficient keys distribution process, in terms of bandwidth and computation
power.
HI-KD [HBBC05], a hash-based hierarchical key distribution protocol for group communication, is a
member of this approach. Within this protocol, group members are assembled into several classes. Members
in class i share a secret key ki. Each member can communicate with members of its class (intra class
communications), or with members belonging to the others classes (inter classes communications).
The hierarchical confidentiality model is ensured, in Hi-KD, via a list of keys established as follows. Based
on a randomly generated key, called k1, corresponding to the first class key, a list of keys is generated
through a one-way hash function, such that: kc   1=H(kc). kc being the key of the class c. Members in class i
can therefore generate the keys of the lower classes j ( j  i), and accede to their secure communications.
3 Verification of Group Protocols
Research in formal verification of the security of two and three party protocols has been ongoing for
a number of years. It has given so successful interesting results in the last years that this field could be
considered as saturated. Nowadays, there is a renewed interest for modelling and verifying other kinds
of protocols that are more complex in the sense that they highlight new requirements and consider some
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complicated intended security properties. As such, the problem of analysing group protocols [STW98,
Mea00, TJ03, SBM04] has gained increasing importance. Significant attacks on such protocols have been
found. Several analysis methods have been used in this task. They vary from manual techniques to automatic
ones.
One of the most interesting techniques done by hand is suggested by Pereira and Quisquater in [PQ03].
They have introduced a method converting the problem of ownership of some information by the intruder
to a problem of resolution of a system of linear equations. With this method, several attacks have been
discovered in the protocols suite CLIQUES [AST00]. In these attacks, the intruder can have an imaginative
and free behaviour. For example, he can take part to a protocol session, and eavesdrop some information to
use it in another protocol session in order to obtain some secret. This method has also permitted to obtain a
generic result: this is impossible to design an authenticated group key agreement protocol built on A-GDH
for a number of participants greater than or equal to four [PQ04].
Nam, Kim et Won [NKW04] show that the Bresson-Chevassut-Essiari-Pointcheval’s group key agree-
ment scheme [ECEP04] does not meet the main security properties. The analysis of the protocol GKE.Setup
(one of the the scheme’s protocols) leads to three attacks. The first attack is a violation of the property of
implicit authentication. The second one is about forward secrecy and the last one is a known keys attack.
An improved version of the protocol has then been proposed.
Some automatic tools have been extended with the purpose of dealing with group protocols and their
specific requirements. Several attacks have been found. For example in [TJ03], Taghdiri and Jackson have
modelled a multicast group key management protocol proposed by Tanaka and Sato [TS01]. They have
been able to discover counterexamples to supposed properties. They have then proposed an improved pro-
tocol. However, in their model, no active attacker was included. Their improved protocol has been analysed
in [SB04] by CORAL and two serious attacks have been found. CORAL has also been used to discover
other attacks concerning two protocols: Asokan-Ginzboorg [AG00] and Iolus [Mit97].
Other works have been tackled the complexity due to the exploitation of an infinite search space. This pro-
blem, often met in group protocols, arises from the fact that even a legal execution of the protocol requires
an unlimited number of steps. Meadows [MS01] has then extended the NRL protocol analyser in order to
tackle the GDOI’s protocols. Although the Diffie-Hellman exponentiation has been introduced in this tool,
Meadows’ attempt to rediscover Pereira-Quisquater attacks on the CLIQUES suite has failed [Mea00].
Other automatic tools, intended rather to search for attacks, have been extended to tackle the new require-
ments used in group protocols: for example algebraic primitives (XOR . . . ) or the exponentiation often met
in extensions of key agreement based on Diffie-Hellman. Among these tools, we find the Cl-Atse tool, one
of four back-Ends used in AVISPA [ABB   05]. A tool that has treated a large number of Internet security
protocols.
4 Example of Hierarchical Group Protocols
In this section, we describe the hierarchical group key management protocol that we chose to verify
and validate. This protocol is dedicated to operate within PMR (Private Mobile Radio) networks. These
networks allow users groups, equipped with wireless devices, to secure their voice, data or multimedia
communications.
The group key management protocol is composed of several sub-protocols, ensuring the security of the
communications between users within the PMR network. These sub-protocols are defined within the RNRT
SAFECAST project †, in partnership with ENST-PARIS, UTC, LAAS, and EADS, in order to manage and
to follow the behavior of a group in the course of time.
A group is sub-divided into several hierarchical classes, with different levels, as is illustrated in figure 1.
Members of class i use, to ensure secure communications between them, a shared key called T EKi.
Among these members, a privileged agent is distinguished: the chief of the class . The chief the group is
thus represented by the chief of the first class. Members of class i have access to the secure communications
of the lower classes (of level j such that j    i). However, they could not accede to the communications of
† http://www.telecom.gouv.fr/rnrt/rnrt/projets/safecast.htm
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FIG. 1 – Keys management within PMR networks
the upper classes. To do so, the different keys T EKi must be linked via a one-way hash-function f (cf Figure
1), as follows:
f   T EKi   T EKi   1
f n  1   T EK1   T EKn
The keys confidentiality is ensured via the establishment of 8 sub-protocols:
1. TEK generation and distribution: Initially, the chiefs of the first class generate the traffic encryption
key T EK0, and distribute it to members of lower classes, encrypted with T EK init keys. In what fol-
lows, we present the specification of this protocol. In section 5, we verify and validate it via AVISPA.
2. Periodic renewal of the TEK: is triggered each 24 hours, and is the responsibility of the chiefs of
the group.
3. Members Join: a group on mission can require reinforcement from the base of operations, which
sends one or more members who must join the group initially formed.
4. Members re-integration: this sub-protocol is used when a member losses its connectivity with its
group, due to resources or reachability problems, and wants to re join it and accede to the communi-
cations of its original class.
5. Members exclusion: the chief of a group can decide to exclude a member when it puts the security
of the group in danger. This member will be added to the blacklist, and can not re join the group any
more.
6. Members promotion: a member moves from a class i to an upper class j.
7. Members degradation: a member moves from a class i to a lower class j, following a request of this
member, or an order from a group chief.
8. Merge of groups: two groups k1 and k2 can merge into a group k, managed by a chief of the two
initial groups, after negociation and election.
TEK generation and distribution protocol
Each member of class Cc holds a pre-deployed key T EK initc (obtained for example at its authentication).
c represents the hierarchical level (C1 is the highest level class and Cn the lowest level class). Nodes in class
Cc know the keys T EK initl
 
l

c

. The TEK generation and distribution process is carried out as follows:
1. Nodes of C1 execute Diffie-Hellman (DH) to ensure cooperation and collobaration between them ;
2. The last node M in DH computes the TEKs via the relation T EKi   1  f
 
T EKi  .
3. M distributes the TEK MESSAGE:
 
TEK1  T EKinit1 

TEK2  TEKinit2 		

T EKn  TEKinitn 
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Nodes of the classe C1 execute DH to generate T EK1 of level 1. Then, the others TEKs of lower classes
will be computed via T EK1, thanks to the one-way function f. Therefore, a member from a level c is able to
accede data exchanged between members of its class, and from lower classes, and is not able to reach upper
levels communications.
The algorithm executed by a node belonging to the class Cc is thus the following.
While receiving TEK MESSAGE(m1

m2
	
mn) with mi 

TEKi  T EKiniti , i=1,2,...,n:
BEGIN
Decrypt mc with T EK initc
END
5 Modelling and Verification
We aim to formally verify the different protocols of the key management in PMR networks previously
described in section 4. We have opted for the AVISPA tool [ABB   05] (Automated Validation of Internet Se-
curity Protocols and Applications), and more precisely for the Back-end Cl-Atse. This tool has been chosen
since it can express two of the most treated security properties: secrecy and authentication. Besides, it per-
mits also to deal with other requirements used in the protocols to be verified such as the exponentiation. . .
In order to verify a protocol using the AVISPA tool, the protocol has to be first specified in a protocol
specification language: HLPSL [CCC   04] (High Level Protocol Specification Language). This language
is based on roles: basic roles for representing each participant role, and composition roles for representing
scenarios of basic roles. Each role is independent from the others, getting some initial information by
parameters, communicating with other roles by channels. The HLPSL specification is translated to a low
level language named IF (Intermediate Format) via a HLPSL2IF translator. The output of this translator is
an input to different verification tools: Back-Ends. We limit ourselves to the Back-end Cl-AtSe. Cl-AtSe
provides a translation from a specification written as transition relation in the IF, into a set of constraints
which can be effectively to find attacks to protocols. Both translation and checking are fully automatic.
Cl-AtSe can deal also with algebraic operators such as XOR or also the exponentiation. . .
5.1 Difficulties of the Verification
Starting from specifications in natural language, the first step of the work consists in raising the ambi-
guities. Modelling seems then a necessary passage but rather a delicate one since the result of the formal
verification is relative to the confidence of this modelisation.
We focus in this section on the protocol of key generation and diffusion presented in section 4. As
previously described, this protocol dosn’t express concretly neither the entities involved nor the messages
exchanged nor the initial knowledge of each participant. A second version of the protocol is as follows:
 
1


m11k  

m21k : α

αr11k
 
2


m21k  

m31k : α
r21k

αr11k

αr11kr21k
 
3


m31k  

m11k : αr21kr31k
 
3


m31k  

m21k : αr11kr31k
 
4



C jk  Gk tel que j  1


mi jk  C jk

m31k  

mi jk :
 f j  1   αr11kr21kr31k

 TEKinitjk
where:
– Gk denotes the k-th group;
– C jk denotes the j-th class of the k-th group;
– mi jk denotes the i-th element of the class C jk;
– m1 jk denotes the Leader of the class C jk;
– ri jk denotes a random number generated by mi jk.
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Athor information is necessary for the verification: initial knowledge of each entity:
m11k α

r11k

T EKinitjk and f

m21k α

r21k

T EKinitjk and f

m31k α

r31k

T EKinitjk and f

mi jk j  1 T EK initjk and f

Starting from this description, the protocol is specified in HLPSL. However, there are still constraints that
must be solved. For instance, despite the capability of Cl-AtSe to dealing with the exponentiation used
here in the agreement of Diffie-Hellman, it can not handle the diffusion for a large number of participants
as the case of the 4-th message of the protocol. As such, we have focused only on some instances of the
protocol. For classes, we have opted for the case of three classes (of level 1, 2 and 3). As for participants,
we have considered three entities in the first level and a representative for each other class (2 and 3). It is
noticed that thanks to the notion of roles in HLPSL, we were able to vary the number of participants in both
classes 2 and 3. In fact, for the studied protocols, members of the same class have almost the same behavior
concerning messages’ reception and emission. As such, it is sufficient to define the representative’s role of
one class and then to mention the number of roles to be executed in the session. However, by increasing the
number of roles, the procedure of attack’s search may not come to an end. In our case, we have been limited
to two entities per class. The specification of the key generation protocol is given in section 5.2. The whole
of protocols have been checked in a similar way, thus making it possible to manage for example certificates
in protocoles such as the protocol of join. . .
5.2 Specification in HLPSL
We specify in this section the protocol of key generation and distribution. This protocol describes a
messages exchange between members of the first class of the group. Then, a key (relative to a class) is
diffused to lower classes. We consider here a group G1. We suppose we have to deal with three classes. The
first class is composed of two elements. As for the two other classes, each one contains one element. We
have then four basic roles: member11, member12, member2, and member3. The two basic roles member11
and member12 are specified as follows:
%% TEK Generation with Four Participants
%% First Role of the first Class
role member11 (M111,M211,M121,M131: agent,
Alpha: nat,
Snd, Rcv: channel(dy))
played_by M111 def=
local State: nat,
R1: text,
X1,TEK1: message
const id1: protocol_id
init State:=0
transition
step1. State=0 /\ Rcv(start)
=|> R1’ := new()
/\ Snd(exp(Alpha,R1’))
/\ State’:=1
/\ witness(M111,M211,M211_M111_R22,exp(Alpha,R1’))
step2. State=1 /\ Rcv(X1’)
=|> TEK1’:= exp(X1’,R1)
/\ State’:=2
/\ secret(TEK1’,id1,{M111,M211})
/\ request(M111,M211,M111_M211_R2,X1’)
end role
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%% Second Role of The First Class
role member12 (M111,M211,M121,M131: agent,
Alpha: nat,
TEK2init, TEK3init: symmetric_key,
F: hash_func,
Snd, Rcv: channel(dy))
played_by M211 def=
local State: nat,
R2: text,
X2,TEK1: message
const id1,id2,id3: protocol_id
init State:=0
transition
step1. State=0 /\ Rcv(X2’)
=|> R2’:=new()
/\ TEK1’:= exp(X2’,R2’)
/\ Snd(exp(Alpha,R2’))
/\ Snd({F(TEK1’)}_TEK2init,{F(F(TEK1’))}_TEK3init)
/\ State’:=1
/\ secret(TEK1’,id1,{M111,M211})
/\ secret(F(TEK1’),id2,{M111,M211,M121})
/\ secret(F(F(TEK1’)),id3,{M111,M211,M131})
/\ witness(M211,M111,M111_M211_R2,exp(Alpha,R2’))
/\ request(M211,M111,M211_M111_R22,X2’)
end role
In this specification, the first two roles member11 and member12 execute the Diffie-hellman algorithm
in order to compute the key of the first class TEK1. It is now for the last member of the first class (the role
member12) to diffuse the keys of second and third classes, respectively F(TEK1) and F(F(TEK1)).
The third role: member2 represnts a member of the second class.
%% Third Role : A member from The second class
role member2 (M111,M211,M121,M131: agent,
TEK2init: symmetric_key,
Snd, Rcv: channel(dy))
played_by M121 def=
local State: nat,
TEK2: symmetric_key
const id2: protocol_id
init State:=0
transition
step1. State=0 /\ Rcv({TEK2’}_TEK2init)
=|> State’:=1
/\ secret(TEK2’,id2,{M111,M211,M121})
end role
The fourth role: member3 is specified in a similar way as member2. For studying the protocol we have to
define what is a session: it corresponds to a parallel execution of roles member11, member12, member2 and
member3.
%%The role session between the four participants
role keyGeneration(SC, RC: channel(dy),
M111, M211, M121, M131: agent,
F: hash_func,
Alpha: nat,
TEK2init, TEK3init: symmetric_key
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) def=
composition
member11(M111,M211,M121,M131,Alpha,SC,RC)
/\ member12(M111,M211,M121,M131,Alpha,TEK2init,TEK3init,F,SC,RC)
/\ member2(M111,M211,M121,M131,TEK2init,SC,RC)
/\ member3(M111,M211,M121,M131,TEK3init,SC,RC)
end role
The HLPSL specification is completed by the environment role which is composed of the instances of
sessions to be analysed. In the example below, a normal execution is presented (without the participation of
the intruder). We have to note that it is in this role that the number of participants belonging to lower classes
should be varied.
%%The main role
role environment() def=
local Snd, Rcv: channel(dy)
const m111,m211,m121,m131: agent,
f: hash_func,
alpha: nat,
tekin2, tekin3: symmetric_key
intruder_knowledge = {m111,m211,m121,m131}
composition
keyGeneration(Snd,Rcv,m111,m211,m121,m131,f,alpha,tekin2,tekin3)
end role
Finally, the security properties to be checked are listed in the goal section:
goal
secrecy_of id1, id2, id3
authentication_on M111_M211_R2
authentication_on M211_M111_R22
end goal
In this protocol, the keys’ secret have to be checked according to their belonging to classes. For instance,
the key of the first class has to be known only by members of this class (M111 and M211). The key of
the second class is known by members of the second class and of the higher classes (here only the first
class). Another security property was checked here: the authentication between the two members: M111
and M211. M111 must be sure that the contribution of M211 (exp(Alpha,R2’)) comes really from M211
and not from any body else, and the same for M211.
5.3 Results and Limits of the Verification
The whole of protocols of both the architecture proposed in section 4, and the group key management
architecture BALADE [BCF05], has been specified in HLPSL and then verified by Cl-AtSe. The result we
found for almost all the protocols was positif. Indeed, we were be able to detect an attack on the members
promotion protocol. This protocol, as it was defined above in section 6, focus on the case of two parties:
the first one m1 jk is the leader of the class C j. The second one mlik belongs to a lower class Ci, and longs to
become member of the class C j.
mlik sends his identity certificate to m1 jk, who uses the public key given in the certificate to encrypt the
class key T EK jk, and the new generated belonging certificate:
 
1


mlik  

m1 jk : CI
 
mlik 
 
2


m1 jk  

mlik :

TEK jk

CAp
 
mlik   pkmlik
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As the certificate is modelled by a first part transmitted in clear, and a second part encrypted, the intruder
can intercept the first message, get the public key of mlik, and use it to form a similar message to the one
waited by mlik, in order to fool him.
The trace of the attack is given in Figure 2.
Agent
i
Agent
(mkl1,4)
start
{mkl1.v.sn.vp.hg.mg.lg.h.pk.l} (inv(pkca)).mkl1.v.sn.vp.hg.mg.lg.h.pk.l
{TEKj(4).CAp(4)} pk
()
msc ATTACK TRACE
FIG. 2 – Figure a` ajouter
To avoid this attack, a new version of the protocol was proposed:
 
1


mlik  

m1 jk :

SeqNummlik  pk   1  mlik 


Hash1
 pk   1

mlik 

CI
 
mlik 
Hash1 est le condense´ du message

SeqNummlik  pk   1  mlik 
 
2


m1 jk  

mlik :

SeqNumm1 jk

TEK jk

CAp
 
mlik   pkmlik


Hash2
 pk   1

m1 jk 

CI
 
m1 jk 
Hash2 est le condense´ du message

SeqNumm1 jk

T EK jk

CAp
 
mlik   pkmlik

The solution consists on adding a signature of the message (2), using the private key of m1 jk. Thus, mlik
can authenticate the source of the message, and extract the valid class key T EK jk. A sequence number is
introduced in each message, to avoid replay attacks.
The results we found were influenced by several constraints. In fact, only particular instances of pro-
tocols have been checked (number of classes in a group, number of participants per class. . . ). Then, each
protocol has been verified independently from other protocols. However, eventual attacks may come from
an interleaving between messages issued from different sub-protocols managing the same set of participants
such as the attack found by CORAL [SB04] of the protocol Tanaka-Sato [TS01]. Thus, it would be more
interesting to be able to treat automatically interleavings between the different sub-protocols of a protocol
or the different protocols of the same architecture.
6 Summary and Future Works
In this paper, we have presented the specific security issues and vulnerabilities of hierarchical group
protocols. We have also pinpointed works concerning the verification of such kind of protocols. We have
introduced afterwards an hierarchical group key management protocol, within PMR networks, and the dif-
ferent sub-protocols constituting it. This architecture has been verified using the Back-end Cl-AtSe of the
Automatic Verification of Hierarchical Groups
AVISPA tool. We were able to deal with the exponentiation of Diffie-Hellman. An attack was found in the
members promotion protocol and a new version is proposed.
Verifying hierarchical group protocols with tools destined for attacks’ search is a first step to validate
them. Indeed, having positif results (no attack found) does not mean that the protocol is correct. We must
go through a second step: verifying this protocol with tools destined to proofs.
As the need of hierarchical group applications is increasing, automatic verification tools should be ex-
tended in order to deal with the new requirements in such complex security protocols. Indeed, they should
be able to handle an unbounded number of participants. Besides, they have to tackle some new security
properties like integrity or properties related to time.
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